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COMMENTARY 
 
GILLICK REINSTATED: JUDGING MID-CHILDHOOD 
COMPETENCE IN HEALTHCARE LAW - An NHS Trust v ABC & 
A Local Authority [2014] EWHC 1445 (Fam). 
 
SUMMARY 
This case commentary discusses a recent case concerning the competence of a 13 
year-old girl to consent to the termination of her pregnancy. It critically analyses four 
specific elements of the judgment - Gillick competence, the impact of best interests, 
judicial deference to medical opinion, and individualism and the construction of 
undue influence. It concludes by commending the approach taken by the court as a 
reinstatement of the law as originally intended in Gillick but is nonetheless cautious as 
to its likely overall effect upon child decision-making. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The short case of An NHS Trust v ABC & A Local Authority,1 appears, at first glance, 
to contain little more than a declaration from the High Court concerning the 
competence of a young person, A, to make a decision about her own healthcare. Yet 
its interest lies in the promising signs pertaining to the recognition of adolescent 
competence. Although in general, case law tends to address the most difficult or novel 
cases that would perhaps not be representative of the daily decision-making that 																																																								1	[2014] EWHC 1445 (Fam).	
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occurs within the context of the family, the doctors surgery or hospital ward, ABC 
marks the first time that a court has held a child as young as A- barely aged 13, to be 
Gillick competent. However, I contend that in so doing, the court overlooked the 
relational considerations that are especially important in mid-childhood decision-
making. 
 
The judgment contains four key features that will be discussed in this commentary. 
First, ABC shows that despite academic disquiet over the theoretical coherence of 
Gillick 2 and past judicial reticence about practically applying it,3 a test for 
competence can be constructed wherein children as young as 13 can meet the criteria, 
even in an area as potentially controversial as abortion. Second, the judgment 
represents a striking departure from past case law. By placing a square focus upon 
Gillick competence, it correspondingly sidelines enquires into ‘best interests’ 
traditionally seen in cases concerning children in mid-childhood.4 Third, despite such 
forward-thinking, the court took a traditional individualised and medicalised approach 
to establishing A’s competence, which consequently raises questions about the place 
and weight of medical opinion in the process of judicial decision-making. Fourth, 
accordingly, the judgment failed to fully take on board A’s relational interests, 
particularly the value that lay in her relationships with and responsibilities to, her 
parents and grandmother and the wider community. Rather, the court viewed her as an 
unconnected individual,5 whose decision-making must remain untainted by familial 
‘influence’.  
 
In contrast, advocates of a relational model of decision-making consider that a 
person’s competence is constructed within the web of relationships that surround 
them,6 that relational influence and collaboration is a practical reality of decision-
																																																								
2 For example: Stephen Gilmore and Jonathan Herring, ‘”No” is the Hardest Word: Consent and 
Children’s Autonomy’ (2011) 23 Child & Family Law Quarterly 3.	
3  Re E (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1992] 2 FCR 219; Re R (A Minor) (Wardship: 
Consent to Treatment)[1992] Fam 11, [1991] 4 All ER 177, [1992] 2 FCR 229; Re W (A 
Minor)(Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 627, [1993] Fam 64; Re L (Medical Treatment: Gillick 
Competency) [1998] 2 FLR 810, [1999] 2 FCR 524. 
4 I shall define ‘mid-childhood’ as between the ages of 8 and 14 years old. 
5 See	Martha Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject and The Responsive State’ [2010] 60 Emory Law 
Journal 251.		
6 Jennifer Nedelsky, Laws Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy and Law (2012 OUP). 
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making7 and that the impact of the decisions on those relationships is of ethical 
importance.8 I argue that a consideration of relational interests is all the more vital in 
mid-childhood, as it is a period characterized by Samantha Brennan as the ‘messy but 
morally important’ reality of children who are neither completely dependent nor fully 
autonomous.9	This is an area that has been under theorized in the academic literature 
and largely ignored in the courtroom, yet it raises profound questions concerning the 
nature of vulnerability, the value of bodily integrity, the importance of relational 
identity and the value of collaborative decision-making. A consideration of these 
issues, would have enriched the decision-making process in this case and I propose to 
discuss them in the light of the above four features that were prominent in the case. 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
The starting point when considering decisions relating to the upbringing of a child 
aged under 16, or the administration of her property, is the Children Act 1989. Section 
1(1) states that when a court is called upon to determine such questions, the child’s 
welfare shall be the court’s paramount consideration. In order to assist with the 
determination of the child’s welfare, s1(3) of the Act provides a ‘welfare checklist’ of 
factors which the court shall have regard to. Further, the welfare or ‘best interests’ 
principle can be seen to underpin the operation of the courts inherent jurisdiction,10 
and is enshrined in International Conventions such as the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child 1989 (UNCRC). Article 3 (1) states that:  
 
In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private 
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or 
legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary 
consideration. 
 
However, the test for determining the competence of children aged under 16 to make 
such decisions for themselves has not been addressed in legislation. In contrast to the 																																																								
7  David Archard, ‘Children, Adults, Best Interests and Rights’ (2013) 13(1) Medical Law International 
55, 60. 8	Jonathan Herring, Family Law (5th edn, 2011 Pearson Education Ltd) 40.	9	Samantha Brennan, ‘Children’s Choices or Children’s Interests: Which do their Rights Protect?’ in 
David Archard and Colin Macleod (eds), The Moral and Political Status of Children (2002 OUP) 65.	
10  See Re R and Re W (n3). 
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position of children aged 16 and 17, which is governed by the Family Law Reform 
Act 1969,11 for those under 16 the common law prevails, as demonstrated in the 
leading case of Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA.12 The case involved a 
challenge by Victoria Gillick to the legality of a memorandum of guidance issued by 
the Department of Health and Social Security to doctors. It stated that they might, in 
exceptional circumstances, provide contraceptive advice and treatment to girls aged 
under 16 without parental consent. The judgment of Lord Scarman sums up the 
majority opinion, that  
 
(…) the parental right to determine whether or not their minor child below the 
age of 16 will have medical treatment terminates if and when, the child 
achieves a sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable him or her to 
understand fully what is proposed.13 
 
In addition, Lord Scarman asserted that the child must also have ‘sufficient maturity’ 
to understand the moral, family, emotional and long-term health implications of her 
decision. Lord Fraser’s approach differed in that he set out a checklist of five factors 
(the Fraser Guidelines) for doctors to consider in determining whether the child has 
reached the level of competence required. These hinge on the child’s comprehension 
of the medical advice and require the proposed treatment is in her best interests. For 
those children who do not meet the threshold for competence, the best interests test 
continues to apply. 
 
Whilst Gillick was hailed as ‘remarkably enlightened’ in its recognition of the 
autonomy of children,14 it has come under increasing strain.15 As a decision that was 
made in the specific context of contraceptive advice and treatment, it has been applied 
to an ever-wider range of scenarios. In these subsequent cases however, it became 
apparent that judges were reluctant to allow even older adolescents to make 
determinative decisions. Instead, judges either acknowledged the child’s competence 																																																								
11  S8(1) sets out the position that those aged 16 or above are presumed to have the same capacity to 
consent to their own medical treatment, as if they were adults. 
12 [1986] 1 FLR 224, [1986] AC112, [1985] 3 WLR 830 
13 ibid 189.	
14 Jane Fortin, Children’s Rights and the Developing Law (2009 CUP) 8. 94. 
15 Emma Cave, ‘Goodbye Gillick? Identifying and resolving problems with the concept of child 
competence’ (2014) 34(1) Legal Studies 103,105. 
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but overrode it in the name of best interests,16 or manipulated the criteria for 
competence so that the bar was set so high that it was easy to find the child 
incompetent.17  
 
Of course, human rights claims in relation to children’s decision-making have been on 
the agenda since the UK ratified the UNCRC in 1991.18 Article 12 of the Convention 
mandates that children capable of forming their own views should be enabled to 
participate in decision-making in accordance with ‘the age and maturity of the child’. 
This shift in focus has been evidenced in some of the recent case law relating to mid-
childhood healthcare decisions where children’s voices are more often heard and 
where judges are much clearer about the importance and weight of children’s 
wishes.19 This accords with the general trend in the law of greater judicial acceptance 
of human rights concerns, as required by the Human Rights Act 1998. As Emma Cave 
contends, such mounting recognition makes the difficulties of Gillick all the more 
pertinent.20 Yet discussions of rights have largely remained cursory. Until ABC 
judicial reluctance to deem children competent meant that rights were inevitably 
trumped by welfare concerns.21  ABC marks a clear change of approach. 
 
III. THE CASE – FACTS AND REASONING 
The facts of the case are very straightforward.  At the time of the hearing on 21st 
March 2014, A was aged 13 years and 1 week. She was living with her parents in the 
North of England. Four days prior to the hearing, A’s grandmother had taken A to the 
local GP’s surgery after noticing that she had a ‘bump at her waist’.22 A pregnancy 
test confirmed that she was pregnant. The following day a consultant paediatrician 
examined A and referred her for a scan, which dated her pregnancy at over 21 weeks. 
A expressed her wish to terminate her pregnancy. The case therefore became urgent as 
A was less than 3 weeks away from the 24-week cut off point for termination of 
pregnancy under ground (a) of section 1(1) Abortion Act 1967. A was seen by a 																																																								
16 See Re R; Re W  (n3); Re P (A Child) [2014] EWHC 1650 (Fam). 
17 See Re E; Re L (n3). 	
18 See also R (on application of Axon) v Secretary of State for Health [2006] EWHC 37 (Admin), 
which approved Gillick, post the HRA 1998 and in the context of abortion. 
19 See for example, Re S (A Minor)(Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1995] 1 FCR 604; Re M (A 
Child)(Medical Treatment) [1999] All ER (D) 798; F v F (n25). 
20 Cave (n15) 104  
21 See Re C & F (Children) [2003] EWHC 1376 (fam), para 298. 
22 ABC (n1) para 3. 
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consultant obstetrician and gynaecologist, and a senior midwife. The Trust 
Safeguarding Team also reviewed the case. Due to the fact that A was found to be 
‘uncommunicative’ during these meetings, the healthcare professionals raised doubts 
concerning her competence.23 They applied to the High Court for declaratory relief, in 
order to determine if she possessed the appropriate competence, ‘so that the position 
is put beyond doubt’, or in the event that the court found that she lacked competence, 
that it would be in her best interests to terminate the pregnancy.24  
 
The judge in the case, Mostyn J, began by focusing in on the question of Gillick 
competence, citing Lord Fraser’s construction of the test that the child will be 
competent to consent if ‘she has sufficient understanding and intelligence to know 
what they [the proposed treatments] involve.' 25 He relied heavily upon the medical 
evidence from an interview on the day of the hearing between consultant psychiatrist 
Dr Ganguly and A (a transcript of which was appended to the judgment). In that 
interview A had expressed a ‘clear and persistent’ wish that her pregnancy be 
terminated as ‘she could not cope with its continuance and it would stress her to a 
considerable degree’.26  Mostyn J held that he was fully satisfied that A understood 
the options open to her, the risks attached to them and their implications. He 
concluded that A did meet the threshold to be deemed competent and as such it would 
‘now be for A to decide what she wishes to do’.27 
 
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
A. Gillick Competence 
The judgment is to be applauded for its unambiguous stance on the determinative 
impact of a finding of competence, summed up in the assertion by Mostyn J that ‘(…) 
if I am to determine that A does have sufficient understanding and intelligence to 
know what a termination would involve, then that is the end of the matter’.28 It could 
be said that the judgment marks a return to the test for competence as it was initially 
framed in Gillick. It is certainly in the spirit of respect for the child’s participatory 
																																																								
23 ibid para 8. 
24 ibid para 6. 
25 Gillick (n12) 239. 26	ABC	(n1)	para	13.	27	ibid	para	15.	
28 ibid para 9. 
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rights as posited in the UNCRC 29 and CA 1989.30 Within the judgment may also lie a 
pragmatic recognition of children’s increased ability to access information relevant to 
the decision via modern technology, combined with the fostering of an environment 
within the legal process in which children are more willing and able to share their 
viewpoint. Further, allowing the competent child to chose for herself whether or not 
to have a termination, acknowledges the ‘deeply personal’ nature of the potential 
procedure.31 It also reflects the child’s interest in bodily integrity, and respects the 
notion that in mid-childhood, emotional connection to bodily experience and the 
impact of the body upon individual self-identity becomes increasingly important.	   
 
However, it is questionable on the evidence in this case whether A was indeed 
competent. This, of course, is dependent upon the interpretation of the requirements 
laid out in Gillick. The court in ABC used only part of Lord Fraser’s test in focusing 
on whether A had ‘sufficient understanding and intelligence’. Yet it omitted to 
consider Lord Scarman’s fuller test of competence, which, whilst criticised as 
requiring a child to show ‘greater decision-making skills than the law requires of 
adults (…)’,32 many consider to constitute the ratio of the case.33 In the context of 
abortion Lord Scarman’s requirement to include the ‘moral and family questions’ 
might require, for example, a consideration of the wishes of the family and the impact 
of the decision upon their relationship with the girl, the girl’s religious or cultural 
values, the social and emotional impact of the decision, and the implications of either 
a termination or continued pregnancy upon the girl’s future plans. In ABC however, 
evidence from Dr Ganguly apparently focuses upon the biological aspects, by 
claiming that A ‘certainly had a good understanding of the fact that she was pregnant 
and what it involved’, whilst neglecting to enquire about relational matters. Indeed, it 
is noteworthy that Dr Ganguly’s method of assessing A’s competence by verifying 
that ‘she was able to (…) understand it because she was able to recount’, that ‘(…) 
she was able to retain the information and tells us what these options were’ and that 
‘she had sufficient option to check out anything that she did not understand (…)’,34 
																																																								
29 Article 12. 
30 See S1(3)(a).	
31 Jonathan Herring, ‘Children’s Abortion Rights’ (1997) 5 Medical Law Review 257, 261. 
32  Sarah Elliston, The Best Interests of the Child in Healthcare (2007 Routledge-Cavendish) 83. 
33 See Axon (n18). 
34 Transcript of Dr Ganguly’s evidence. 
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appears to be much more like the criteria used to determine the capacity of adults 
under the Mental Capacity Act 200535 than those contained in Gillick.  
 
Further, it is apparent that allowances were made in the level of understanding 
required of A – for instance Dr Ganguly notes ‘whether she understood everything in 
great detail is questionable, because she is after all, 13 years old’,36 which may 
conflict with the adult nature of the decision in question. This may be seen as a 
justified relaxation of the standard for competence, again in the spirit of the MCA 
where S 3(2) states that a person is not to be construed as unable to understand 
information relevant to a decision, if it is explained to her using simple language. 
However, it must be remembered that the MCA test is not currently the legal test for 
determining child competence. This hybrid approach of the court that claims to follow 
Gillick yet accepts medical evidence that appeared to be based upon the MCA 
criteria,37 may be indicative of both a judicial acknowledgment of the theoretical 
incoherence of a strict construction of Gillick combined with a pragmatic recognition 
of the ambiguities of applying it within clinical practice. It certainly stands in contrast 
to other recent case law on Gillick competence, for instance the 2013 case of F v F.38 
Here Theis J held that a 15 year old girl was ‘too naïve’ in her views to be competent 
to refuse consent to the MMR vaccination, even though the procedure proposed was 
merely preventative healthcare and her refusal was based on her sincere vegan 
principles.39 The approach in ABC may be seen as a vindication of Cave’s recent 
argument that a strict construction of Gillick is an ‘inadequate tool’ for the court’s 
task of adjudicating between the complexities of protecting welfare and promoting 
autonomy.40 I agree with her that a more consistent approach would be to apply the 
MCA to people of all ages and this could be combined with an additional common 
law test to protect against the factors that render some adolescents ‘functionally 
incapacitated’.41 Cave posits a test operating under the court’s inherent jurisdiction 
when ‘necessary and proportionate’ to guard against the effects of immaturity and 																																																								
35 Mental Capacity Act 2005 s3. 
36  Transcript (n35). 
37 See Victoria Chico and Lynn Hager, ‘The Mental Capacity Act 2005 and Mature Minors: A Missed 
Opportunity’ (2011) 33(2) J Soc Welfare & Fam L 157, for a discussion on the use of the MCA for 
minors. 
38 F v F [2013] EWHC 2683 (Fam). 
39 ibid para 22 (2). 
40 Cave (n15) 104. 
41 ibid 119-120. 
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undue influence.42 I suggest that such a test constructed to consider and protect the 
child’s relational interests, as explored in Section D below, may be the way forward. 
 
B. Best Interests 
Mostyn J’s reading of the relationship between Gillick competence and best interests 
was also unambiguous, as he noted that if the child reached the required threshold, 
then she could lawfully make a decision ‘even if the result of that would lead her to 
take steps which are wholly contrary to her best interests’.43 His subsequent assertion 
that ‘the question of best interests does not really inform the primary decision I have 
to make, which is whether she has the necessary capacity’, may be a truer 
interpretation of the purpose of the judgment in Gillick but stands at odds with the 
judicial caution that characterises the previous case law. 44 For example, in Re W 
Donaldson LJ claimed that maximizing the child’s participation must be subject to the 
restraints of ‘prudence’ in the name of welfare, 45 whilst Nolan LJ acknowledged the 
court’s duty to defend a competent child’s right to make her own decision, but singled 
out medical treatment as an area where ‘the court can and sometimes must 
intervene’.46 One interpretation of ABC is that the court was making a genuine 
statement that the competent child should be treated in the same “present-facing” 
manner as adults. This would allow them to make decisions, as can adults, which are 
ultimately not in their best interests but respect the reality of their present situation or 
viewpoint – in other words the right to make their own mistakes. This is in contrast to 
the future-orientated, protectionist stance traditionally adopted in children’s decision-
making.47 
 
The fact that ABC concerned termination of pregnancy may have made the decision 
simultaneously trickier and simpler than it might otherwise have been. On the former, 
I concur with Jonathan Herring that it is difficult to come to an objective decision 
about best interests in the context of abortion given the strong and often polarized 
views about the issue, resulting in ‘no real consensus on what is best for a child in any 																																																								
42 ibid 121.	
43 ABC (n1) para 10. 
44 ibid 	
45 Re W (n3) 81 
46 ibid 93.	
47 Cave (n19) 111. 
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particular case’.48 This is illustrated in the transcript of the evidence of Dr Ganguly, 
where Mostyn J asks for his opinion on which option - termination or continuation of 
pregnancy, would be best for A’s mental health. As a child psychiatrist, the doctor 
was well-placed to answer. However, he declined to make a clear assessment, stating 
that it was a ‘very difficult thing to comment on’ and merely reiterated A’s view that 
she ‘would not be able to cope’.49 The fluidity in the notion of ‘best’ in the context of 
abortion decision-making is graphically illustrated in the recent case of X (A child).50 
Based upon 13 year-old X’s ‘unambiguous hostility’ to the prospect of abortion, all of 
the medical experts gave evidence that it would not be in her best interests for her 
pregnancy to be terminated.51 Yet when she apparently changed her mind during the 
course of the hearing, the court was quick to deem that a termination would be in her 
best interests. The only issue that had changed was the child’s views - a 13 year-child 
who had been declared to be incompetent to decide for herself due to her low IQ and 
limited vocabulary.52  
 
Yet, a more cynical interpretation is that ABC is really a best interests decision, 
dressed up in autonomy language. The judgment appears to be underpinned by a 
social policy assumption that 13 year-olds should not be parents. Such an argument 
was seen in the earlier abortion case of Re B, where a consultant pediatrician gave 
evidence that it is ‘highly undesirable’ for a young adolescent to continue with a 
pregnancy.53 The fact that A’s wish to undergo a termination appeared to accord with 
not only medical and local authority viewpoints, but also this larger, unspoken, public 
interest may have made the finding of competence by the court somewhat easier. 
 
C. Judicial Deference to Medical Opinion 
Whilst progressive in its approach to Gillick competence, in ABC we see a re-
emergence of judicial deference to medical opinion. Three times in the mere 18 
paragraph judgment Mostyn J claims that his attempts to summarise the seemingly 
straightforward psychiatric evidence would ‘not do justice to [its] clarity’,54 ‘may lead 																																																								
48 Herring (n31) 261. 
49 Transcript (n35) 
50 [2014] EWHC 1871 (Fam) 
51 ibid para 14 
52 ibid para 13. 
53 Re B (Child: Termination of Pregnancy) [1991] FCR 889, 894. 
54 ABC (n1) para 11 
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to its full impact being lost’55 and was done ‘probably inadequately’.56 This 
incertitude leads the judge to deem it necessary to append the full transcript of Dr 
Ganguly’s evidence to the judgment. It is possible to see this not a matter of deference 
in the traditional sense of an unquestioning reliance upon medical opinion,57 but 
rather a respect for the expertise of the medical professional. Yet, whilst it is true that 
Mostyn J did clearly acknowledge that Dr Ganguly was a ‘consultant psychiatrist of 
some considerable experience’, 58 it is questionable how far a simple assessment of 
capacity is a matter of medical expertise. From the transcript we see that the 
psychiatrist had never made a formal assessment of competence in a court setting,59 
and as noted above, found it difficult to make any clear assessment of what was best 
for A’s mental health. This indicates the artificial nature of judicial determination of 
competence, which is but one moment “frozen in time”, and stands at variance with 
the routine capacity assessments that take place ‘day in and day out’ as part of clinical 
practice.60  Furthermore, Mostyn J’s reliance is out of step with a more recent trend, 
as identified by Muireann Quigley, for deference to medical opinion to be supplanted 
by a form of deference to judicial opinion on issues such as capacity and best 
interests.61 Although Quigley deems this trend ‘worrying’,62 I suggest that on matters 
which do not require particular medical expertise, as is often the case in capacity 
assessments, that the judge is probably better placed to consider the full scope of the 
moral, social, relational and participatory issues as compared to the doctor who will 
primarily be focused upon clinical interests. 
  
What in fact may be at the root of this ‘deference’ is a regrettable but somewhat 
understandable process of mutual legitimization.  Underlying the judgment is the 
suspicion that the case was bought as a result of fear on the part of clinicians about 
negative public reaction, although ultimately no such reaction was evident in media 
																																																								
55 ibid para 12 
56 ibid para 15. 
57 See Muireann Quigley, ‘Best Interests, the Power of the Medical Profession and the Power of the 
Judiciary’ (2008) 16 Health Care Anal 233. 
58 ABC (n1) para 11. 
59 Transcript (n35). 
60 ibid 
61 Quigley (n58) 236. 
62 ibid	
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reporting of the case.63 Mostyn J had clearly stated the purpose of the declaration was 
not so much a statement of respect for A’s autonomy, than a means whereby ‘any later 
criticisms of the Trust, in taking the steps that they did, can be deflected’.64 This is a 
reversion to the provision of the judicial ‘flakjacket’ posited by Lord Donaldson in Re 
W,65 where law is being used by doctors as a means of reinforcing their judgments.66 
Equally to be regretted is the court’s over-reliance upon medical evidence, to provide 
‘scientific legitimacy’ to a judgment on a morally contentious subject.67  
 
D. Individualism and the Construction of Undue Influence 
In ABC the court construed the test of competence for A in a very individualistic way 
and was keen to stress that the decision was ‘hers alone’. 68 This stance is also 
evidenced by Mostyn J’s assertion that his consideration of how A might deal with the 
consequences of her decision within the context of family support was actually 
‘irrelevant to the primary decision’ of competence’.69 Focusing purely on 
competence, as an ‘all or nothing’ issue within the context of abortion obscures the 
reality that girls in mid-childhood may be competent concerning some aspects of the 
abortion decision but may need support to make decisions on others.70 Whilst the 
MCA s1(3) states that for adults’ all practicable steps’ must be taken to help a person 
make a decision and subsequent case-law has confirmed that the test for capacity in 
adults is issue specific,71 for children the need for support or desire to consider the 
impact on others, has been construed as a sign of incompetence.72 In contrast, the 
second half of Lord Scarman’s test discussed in Section A above, highlights the 
desirability of relational thinking when considering decision-making by children.  
 
																																																								63	See	Shoba	Rao,	news.co.au	(10	May	2014).	The	headline	was	later	changed	to	‘Thirteen	year	old	girl	gets	legal	right	to	decide	to	have	an	abortion	for	the	High	Court	in	London’;	Suespicious 
Minds, ‘Thirteen year old has the capacity to terminate pregnancy’ (12 May 2014) 
<suespiciousminds.com/2014/05/page/2/> Last accessed 16 July 2014.	
64 ABC (n1) Para 6 
65 Re W (n3) 785. 
66 Andrew Bainham and Stephen Gilmore, Children: The Modern Law (4th edn 2013 Family Law) 342. 
67 Elliston (n32) 18. 
68 ABC (n1) para 14. 
69 ibid para 16. 
70 Herring (n31) 258. 
71 Dunhill v Burgin (no’s 1 & 2) [2014] UKSC 18. 
72 Re E (n3) 224. 
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Lord Scarman’s relational test could draw our attention to the possibilities of a child’s 
competence being achieved and enhanced through consultation with others.73 The 
“ideal” scenario for Jonathan Herring would be for her to be able to consult with her 
parents or other trusted adults so that she could receive ‘the necessary information to 
make the decision and help in deciding what her wishes are and what is her view of 
the moral issues involved’. This would result in a decision which is ‘careful and 
informed, but also her own’.74 Yet, this type of collaborative approach was not only 
rejected by the court, but also treated with suspicion. In Mostyn J’s summing up he 
notes that A’s decision was ‘not the product of influence by adults in her family’ and 
that she showed no signs of ‘distress’75 When Dr Ganguly was questioned by Counsel 
as to whether A had been ‘coerced or pressed’ by her mother or grandmother, Mostyn 
J interjected and added ‘influenced’ to the list.76 Acknowledging the potential 
vulnerability of the child to parental opinion within the relational model, Herring 
suggests that in the absence of ‘sensitive’ parental communication, undue pressure 
could be guarded against by the child seeking support and information from another 
adult and her doctor.77 However it is puzzling that the more subtle “influence”, which  
I would argue is entirely natural within close relationships, should be categorized in 
ABC in a like manner to undue pressure. 
 
The fact is that adults and children alike are influenced, and choose to be so 
influenced in their decision-making, by any number of ideologies, responsibilities and 
social conventions. To pretend otherwise is to revert to the ‘autonomy myth’.78 
Influence in and of itself does not indicate that a child is unable to form a view for 
herself.79 Indeed, empirical evidence from a study by Ellie Lee into abortion decisions 
made by adolescent girls, confirms that ‘the experience of these young women who 
frame their choice as “their own” cannot be understood in separation from parental 
influence altogether (…)’.80 She found that maternal influence in particular was very 
important for undecided younger adolescents by facilitating the potential for 																																																								
73 Herring (n31) 260. 
74 ibid 261. 
75 ABC (n1) para 14. 
76 Transcript (n35) 
77 Herring (n31) 262. 
78 Fineman (n5) 
79 Jonathan Herring, ‘An Injection of Sense’ [8 November 2013] New Law Journal 9,10. 
80 Ellie Lee, ‘Young Women, Pregnancy and Abortion in Britain: A Discussion of Law in Practice’ 
(2004) 18 Int J of law, Policy & Family 283, 294. 
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maternity when they may have feared they were too young.81 She claims that most 
who experienced parental ‘directiveness’ either for or against termination did not do 
so in a negative way,82 that strong parental reactions against abortion were not 
typical,83 and that abortion decisions were most often made within and with an 
understanding of, the impact on ‘intimate, private areas of interaction’.84  
 
Finally, there is an irony within ABC summed up in Mostyn J’s statement that if A 
continued with the pregnancy, then ‘her family and, indeed, Social Services will need 
to give her considerable support and assistance’ whilst in the event of a termination 
‘her family will need to be at her side and to assist her and support her’.85 It is 
inconsistent that the law rejects collaboration in the decision-making process only to 
call upon it to deal with the consequences of that decision. 
 
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
Brief though it is, ABC is refreshing in that it is a judgment concerning a child in mid-
childhood that places the issue competence at its heart. It has demonstrated for the 
first time, that a child as young as 13 can be both competent and her wishes held to be 
determinative. However, although the case should be applauded for its direct 
approach, it would be wise not to read too much into its scope. As a decision of the 
High Court it will have limited impact upon the earlier constructions of child 
competence found in the previous House of Lords and Court of Appeal decisions, 
which have resulted in much academic criticism.86 Further, reaching the outcome that 
it did may have been simpler for the court as the case involved the question of consent 
rather than refusal. Subsequently, the more contentious issues surrounding adolescent 
refusal of treatment remain unaddressed.87  
 
The judgment is to be commended for its stance that best interests concerns should 
not override a competent child’s wishes. By so doing, it accorded A a measure of 
discretion over a decision which had profound implications for both her immediate 																																																								
81 ibid 291, 293. 
82 ibid 292 
83 ibid	
84 ibid 301.	
85 ABC (n1) para 15.	
86 See (n2)	
87 ibid 
	 15	
bodily integrity and her future life plan. But it has to be queried whether the fact that 
A’s wishes appeared to have concurred with the opinions of the doctors and the Court 
that a termination was in her best interests, may have fostered a situation of 
‘dependent compliance’,88 and thereby facilitated a finding of competence. Although, 
in the case of abortion, it may be difficult to determine what would be ‘best’ for a 
specific 13 year old girl, the subsequent case of X (A Child), shows that where the 
child’s view of her welfare does not concur with the judicial and medical assessment, 
the court may be prepared to resort to the use of force to compel her to receive 
treatment, even in procedures as sensitive as abortion.89 Finally, the atomistic 
perspective of the court to decision-making in mid-childhood is regrettable. A 
preferable approach would be to facilitate collaboration and to begin with a 
presumption that familial ‘influence’ is both a usual and necessary part of the process, 
which for those in mid-childhood both helps to foster competence and is a truer 
reflection of the real-life nature of decision-making.90 
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